Reducing Health Inequalities in Brazil’s Universal Health-Care System: Accountability Politics in São Paulo by Schattan Coelho, Vera
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 2 March 2018: ‘Accountability for Health Equity: Galvanising a Movement for Universal Health Coverage’ 1–6 | 1
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Volume 49 | Number 2 | March 2018
Transforming Development Knowledge
ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR HEALTH EQUITY: 
GALVANISING A 
MOVEMENT FOR 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH 
COVERAGE
Editors Erica Nelson, 
Gerald Bloom and Alex Shankland
13 | 
Vol. 49 No. 2 March 2018: ‘Accountability for Health Equity: Galvanising a Movement for Universal Health Coverage’
| 
Notes on Article Contributors v
Notes on Multimedia Contributors xi
Foreword
The International Health Partnership for UHC 2030 (UHC2030) Core Team xiii
Introduction: Accountability for Health Equity: Galvanising a Movement for  
Universal Health Coverage
Erica Nelson, Gerald Bloom and Alex Shankland 1
Introduction to Multimedia
Sophie Marsden, Karine Gatellier and Sarah King 
Vaishali Zararia, Renu Khanna and Sophie Marsden
Denise Namburete and Erica Nelson 17
Health Accountability for Indigenous Populations: Confronting Power through 
Adaptive Action Cycles
Walter Flores and Alison Hernández 19
Inverted State and Citizens’ Roles in the Mozambican Health Sector
Jose Dias and Tassiana Tomé 35
Accountability and Generating Evidence for Global Health: Misoprostol in Nepal
Jeevan Raj Sharma, Rekha Khatri and Ian Harper 49
The Political Construction of Accountability Keywords
Jonathan Fox 65
Key Considerations for Accountability and Gender in Health Systems in Low- 
and Middle-Income Countries
Linda Waldman, Sally Theobald and Rosemary Morgan 81
Gendered Dimensions of Accountability to Address Health Workforce Shortages  
in Northern Nigeria
Fatima Lamishi Adamu, Zainab Abdul Moukarim and Nasiru Sa’adu Fakai 95
Reducing Health Inequalities in Brazil’s Universal Health-Care System:  
Accountability Politics in São Paulo
Vera Schattan Coelho 109
Making Private Health Care Accountable: Mobilising Civil Society and Ethical  
Doctors in India
Abhay Shukla, Abhijit More and Shweta Marathe 129
Neglected Tropical Diseases and Equity in the Post-2015 Health Agenda
Emma Michelle Taylor and James Smith 147
Glossary 159
Coelho Reducing Health Inequalities in Brazil’s Universal Health-Care System: Accountability Politics in São Paulo
© 2018 The Author. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2018.139
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source 
are credited. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 2 March 2018: ‘Accountability for Health Equity: Galvanising a Movement for 
Universal Health Coverage’; the Introduction is also recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Reducing Health Inequalities in 
Brazil’s Universal Health-Care 
System: Accountability Politics in 
São Paulo*✝
Vera Schattan Coelho
Abstract Brazil relies on the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), a public 
health-care system used by nearly 65 per cent of the population. This article 
analyses the role played by accountability mechanisms in expanding access 
to primary health care in the municipality of São Paulo, Brazil’s largest 
city. Two accountability mechanisms are described and discussed: political 
competition and outsourcing. The article shows that from 2001 to 2016 
the supply of primary care grew and the disparities in access to public 
health services decreased across the city areas with both the best and 
worst indices of income, education, and health. These distributive results 
are striking given how difficult it is to reverse inequalities, as attested by 
the findings of a number of studies in different parts of the world which 
indicate that the richest populations tend to persistently benefit more than 
the poorest from public spending on health. 
Keywords: Brazilian public health system (Sistema Único de Saúde), 
primary care, policy process, health inequities reduction, political 
accountability, managerial accountability, Universal Health Care.
1 Introduction
In Brazil, the issue of  inequalities in the distribution of  health services 
and in health status among different population groups has figured 
in public debate since the late 1970s, and has received considerable 
attention from the Ministry of  Health since the early years of  
implementation of  Brazil’s universal national health-care system, the 
Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS).1 The SUS was enacted by the 1988 
Constitution, which restored democracy in the country after a period 
of  military dictatorship. The health-care system offers all Brazilians 
free access to appointments, tests, hospitalisation, and a wide range of  
medicines, in addition to vaccination campaigns, and prevention and 
health surveillance actions. 
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The SUS defines national policies, which are implemented in a 
decentralised manner by states and municipalities and are financed 
by the three spheres of  government: federal, state, and municipal.2 
The implementation of  primary care is a municipal responsibility, 
which means that political accountability for primary care is located 
principally at the municipal level. 
This article profiles the distribution of  primary health care provided 
by the SUS from 2001 to 2016 among the 31 sub-municipal boroughs 
that make up the municipality of  São Paulo. The municipality has 
12 million inhabitants, with 6.6 million of  them exclusively using the 
SUS.3 In 2001, distribution of  public health services in the city was 
heavily concentrated in the central areas, which also had the best 
socioeconomic indicators (Coelho and Silva 2007). This situation 
changed over the years that followed, spanning four municipal 
administrations whose mandates were exercised by mayors from 
political parties with very different political orientations; chronologically, 
the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), the centrist Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB), the right-wing Democrats (DEM), and then 
the PT again. Despite this left–centre–right oscillation, during this 
period, service distribution consistently tended towards greater equity. 
There was also a consistent trend towards increased use of  outsourcing 
to deliver primary care services, despite the parties’ very different 
ideological positions on outsourcing.
These results are not negligible and can hardly be explained solely by 
the arrival of  new federal programmes and funding in the municipality:4 
had these programmes simply been implemented, and new funding 
used, according to the same logic reflected in the distribution of  existing 
health facilities, this would have easily led to the inequalities already 
present being maintained, or even worsened. Therefore, with a view 
to explaining the results, this study examined the role of  political and 
managerial accountability mechanisms present in the municipality of  
São Paulo in the period 2001–16. 
This article’s two main contributions to the literature are that it: 
(1) profiles the distribution of  SUS services within the municipality 
of  São Paulo over a 16-year period spanning four complete 
administrations, and analyses that profile in terms of  its distributive 
impact; and (2) discusses this impact in light of  the presence of  the 
accountability mechanisms in place in the city during the period: 
electoral competition, as a tool for political accountability, and 
outsourcing, as a tool for managerial accountability.
The remainder of  this article is organised into four sections. Section 2 
presents the debate concerning the role that accountability may play in 
tackling health inequalities. Section 3 describes the main primary care 
policies implemented between 2001 and 2016 by the various political 
parties in office in the São Paulo municipal government. Section 4 
describes the changes that happened in the distribution of  primary 
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health facilities and services in the 31 boroughs during the period, and 
Section 5 discusses the role of  accountability mechanisms in establishing 
the policies that helped to address health inequalities.
2 Conceptual and methodological approach
The findings of  a number of  studies in different parts of  the world 
indicate that the richest populations tend to persistently benefit more 
from public spending on health than the poorest populations (World 
Bank 2004; Huber et al. 2006; Liu, Hotchkiss and Bose 2007; WHO 
and UN-HABITAT 2010). More recently, a growing body of  literature 
on accountability, aligned with its definition in terms of  answerability 
and sanctions, argues that accountability approaches may help to break 
this vicious cycle (Brinkerhoff 2004; Fox 2015). 
Brinkerhoff (2004), in particular, distinguishes three types of  
accountability related to health systems that may play a role in 
effectively informing policy and programmes: financial, performance, 
and political/democratic. According to Brinkerhoff, in the realm of  
financial accountability, provider payment systems can be important 
mechanisms for enforcing increased financial accountability and cost 
control among participating private providers, while performance 
accountability refers to demonstrating and accounting for performance 
in light of  agreed upon targets. 
Political/democratic accountability, in turn, has to do with ensuring that 
government delivers on electoral promises, lives up to public trust, and 
responds to ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns, with the 
political process and elections being the main avenues for this type of  
accountability.
In this article, we explore the relationship between changes to the 
distribution profile of  health services offered by the SUS in the 
municipality of  São Paulo and two types of  accountability – electoral and 
managerial – which relate to the three spheres indicated by Brinkerhoff. 
In the Brazilian debate, these topics have been discussed in parallel. 
Political scientists analyse the importance of  decentralisation in making 
politicians and public policies more responsive to citizens, as well as 
association between party orientation – right, centre, and left – and 
preferences for more redistribution, or more state or market (Arretche 
and Marquez 2002; Viana, Fausto and Lima 2003; Ouverney and 
Fleury 2017). Specialists in public management have explored the 
capacity of  different contractual arrangements to promote greater 
efficiency in public services (Barradas and Mendes 2007; Ibañez and 
Vecina Neto 2007; La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008; Sano and Abrucio 
2008; Médici 2011; Greve and Coelho 2017),5 while authors connected 
to public health have made efforts to demonstrate the connections 
between advances in primary care and improvement, whether in health 
indicators or in reducing inequalities (Hone et al. 2017; Macinko et al. 
2007; Landmann-Szwarcwald and Macinko 2016).
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This article tries to bring these debates closer, to shed light on the 
connections between the mechanisms of  answerability and sanctions 
in the political and managerial spheres and their relationship with 
changes to the distributive profile of  the supply of  public health 
services. To explore these connections we have systematised: (1) the 
primary health-care policies implemented by each of  the four municipal 
administrations of  São Paulo in the period 2001–16; (2) the types of  
contracts adopted in these administrations to implement the policies; 
and (3) the distribution of  health facilities and services in all the 
municipal boroughs during the period.
The policies implemented by each municipal administration were 
analysed systematically through a qualitative study which included 
participant observation at health facilities and 28 interviews in which 
São Paulo Municipal Health Secretariat managers, health service 
providers, and politicians responded to closed and semi-open questions. 
Official documents and academic and press articles were also collected. 
Analysis of  the distribution of  health facilities and services was carried 
out by ordering the 31 boroughs by their Human Development Indices 
(HDIs), which are calculated by the municipality using the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) methodology and census 
data on income, education, and health. Higher HDI indicates better 
socioeconomic conditions (see Figure 1). 
For each borough, the percentage of  the total population that 
exclusively uses SUS services is calculated by the São Paulo Municipal 
Figure 1 Human Development Indices by borough, municipality of São Paulo, 2013
Source Author’s own, based on data from the São Paulo Municipal Department of 
Urban Development.
HDI 
>= 0.900 
0.850–0.899 
0.800–0.849 
< 0.800 
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Health Department of  Epidemiology and Information.6 Peripheral 
areas of  the city present the highest percentages of  SUS users, as 
those who exclusively use the SUS tend to be poor. Quantitative data 
on service provision were obtained from the SUS Department of  
Information Technology (DATASUS).7 From there, two indicators 
related to primary care supply were calculated for the population of  
each borough that exclusively used the SUS: (1) provision of  primary 
care appointments per year, and (2) percentage of  live births with 
provision of  seven or more antenatal appointments. To facilitate 
description, the boroughs were grouped into quartiles according to their 
HDI scores; lower quartiles include boroughs with lower HDIs.
The supposition explored in this study is that in a context of  strong 
electoral competition and modest access to public health services in poor 
and densely populated areas, the promise of  improving services for the 
poor represents an attractive programme that could garner votes for 
parties with different ideological orientations. The institutional conditions 
found in the city – financial and managerial capacity located inside the 
Municipal Health Secretariat to contract private, not-for-profit social 
health organisations (organizações sociais de saúde – OSSs) and the presence 
of  these organisations already delivering primary care – explain ‘how’ 
this programme could be achieved. In short, the presence of  claims for 
answerability and the possibility of  sanctions at both the political and 
managerial levels played a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of  
public primary health services in the poor peripheries of  São Paulo. 
It should be noted that our analysis of  the role of  accountability 
mechanisms in generating policies with distributive impact in favour 
of  areas with worse socioeconomic indicators was constructed from a 
single case. This limits the study’s claim to validity. In that light, we offer 
one plausible explanation of  relations among distributive gains and 
political and managerial accountability mechanisms; causal relations 
among these events remain an open question. After all, variables 
omitted from our analysis may be more strongly associated with 
these distributive gains than those examined here. The possibility of  
replicating this type of  study in other large cities certainly offers scope 
for advancing, beyond what was possible in this study, our knowledge 
of  the role of  accountability mechanisms in reducing inequalities in the 
distribution of  public health services.
3 Politics and policies 
3.1 Baseline
From 1988, through the SUS, municipalities were given greater 
responsibilities in the area of  health policy. In São Paulo it was up to 
Eduardo Jorge, the Health Secretary in the Luiza Erundina (Workers’ 
Party – PT) administration (1989–92), to begin implementing the 
system in the city. Jorge was a historical leader of  the health reform 
movement that had led the creation of  the SUS. His work was marked 
by investments being directed towards providing services in peripheral 
areas of  the city. 
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Health districts and regions were created, a situation that guaranteed 
relative autonomy for expenditure since districts were budgetary units 
(Junqueira 2002; Pinto, Tanaka and Spedo 2009; Coelho, Szabzon 
and Dias 2014). From 1989 to 1992, 50 rounds of  civil service exams 
were made available, nearly doubling the number of  Municipal 
Health Secretariat civil servants. After Erundina’s term was up, the 
staff at the Secretariat included 42,000 civil servants, which reflected 
this administration’s preference for expanding services through 
direct contracting of  health professionals (Junqueira 2002). This 
expansion followed the traditional management model used in public 
administration, where there are several bureaucratic controls, but no 
sanctions if  performance targets are not achieved. 
The election of  Paulo Maluf  (1993–96), of  the right-wing Social 
Democratic Party (PDS), represented an about-turn in this trajectory 
and a clear setback for the SUS in the city. The mayor-elect decided to 
interrupt implementation of  the system and create his own Health Care 
Plan (Plano de Atendimento à Saúde – PAS) focused on contracting medical 
cooperatives to provide care services. This programme, the object of  
great controversy and many grievances, was maintained by his successor, 
Celso Pitta (1997–2000) of  the right-wing Brazilian Progressive Party 
(PPB) (Junqueira 2002; Coelho et al. 2014). Paulo Maluf  and Celso Pitta 
drastically cut the number of  Municipal Health Secretariat civil servants: 
in 2000, there were just 29,000 direct civil servants – a little over half  
as many as during the previous administration – because the PAS 
contracted medical cooperatives to provide services (Junqueira 2002).
A parallel action began in 1995, when the Ministry of  Health and 
the State Health Department – both controlled by Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB) administrations – together with David 
Capistrano, a leader of  the health reform movement and former 
PT mayor of  Santos city, began to support implementation of  a 
pilot Family Health Program (FHP) in the peripheral areas of  São 
Paulo. The programme was given the name Qualis (Qualidade 
Integral em Saúde) and was implemented with the participation of  
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that already had experience of  
providing health services.8 By late 1999, Qualis comprised approximately 
140 family health teams, providing care for about 400,000 residents in 
the city’s peripheral areas (Capistrano Filho 1999).
In short, between 1989 and 1999, as political control of  the São Paulo 
municipal government changed between left and right, the public health 
policies implemented in the city also changed. These changes help 
to illuminate the close relationship, to which we are calling attention, 
between political competition and the concepts and guidelines that have 
been structuring municipal health policy. 
In the 2000 election, all of  the candidates with the exception of  Paulo 
Maluf  were in favour of  terminating the PAS and moving forward with 
the SUS. Marta Suplicy (PT) was already the front runner in the early 
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weeks of  the electoral calendar, remaining in this position and winning 
in a run-off election against Paulo Maluf, with 58.51 per cent of  the vote. 
With this, in 2001, the PT took back control of  the city. At the time, the 
PT and PSDB were both in opposition to the PDS and PPB. However, 
after 2000, the PDS and PPB lost ground and were eventually replaced by 
another right-wing group, the Democrats (DEM), while the PT and PSDB 
began to fiercely dispute municipal elections – with the PSDB eventually 
allying itself  with the DEM party. Below are the main policies pursued by 
each of  the four municipal administrations between 2001 and 2016.
3.2 Policies pursued, 2001–04
In 2001, Suplicy took over as mayor and Eduardo Jorge was again 
appointed as Municipal Health Secretary. At that time, while the SUS 
user population was concentrated in the periphery, the supply of  public 
health facilities and services was still predominantly allocated to the 
more central, older areas of  the city. That is, SUS user populations 
living in areas that enjoyed better socioeconomic indicators were 
favoured by better service supply than those living in peripheral areas 
(Coelho and Silva 2007).
Eduardo Jorge’s arrival at the Municipal Health Secretariat brought 
a series of  important changes to this situation. He resumed the SUS 
project that started during the Erundina administration, beginning with 
the creation of  41 health districts, which were later incorporated into 
the city’s 31 borough administrations.9 At the same time as this structure 
was being set up, Jorge invested in expanding the FHP, at the heart of  
national policy on primary care. Family health teams comprised of  a 
medical general practitioner, nurses, and community health workers 
delivered a wide range of  comprehensive and preventive health-care 
services to defined local populations (approximately 3,400 individuals). 
When Jorge took over the Municipal Health Secretariat, there were 
some 180 teams and his plan was to increase their number tenfold, to 
the order of  1,700 teams by 2004. However, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act, enacted in May 2000, posed a serious obstacle to this plan. 
According to the rules of  the Act, municipal expenditure on active 
and inactive personnel cannot exceed 60 per cent of  its net current 
income, and the municipality had already practically reached this limit. 
Faced with this constraint, Jorge chose to implement ‘convênios’ (service 
agreements) with private OSSs, several of  which already provided 
primary care services in the municipality. Under these agreements, a 
government agency disbursed funds to an OSS that had committed 
to perform the activities contained in the work plan and, later, would 
account for the use of  these resources. This solution resulted in an 
increased supply of  services without qualifying as direct hiring. 
By 2002, when Eduardo Jorge left the Municipal Health Secretariat,10 
the number of  teams had more than doubled. This expansion was 
made possible by convênios signed with 12 OSSs that had a tradition of  
social assistance and health service provision. 
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By the end of  Marta Suplicy’s administration, in 2004, the number of  
primary health care centres (PHCCs) had grown by 70 per cent. The 
criterion used for distributing these facilities was ‘one for every 20,000 
users, with no facility being more than 30 minutes away by foot from 
the user’s residence.’11 In placing these centres, priority was given to 
areas where health facilities were scarcest and where health, education, 
and income indicators were worst. These measures helped, as will be 
seen in Section 4, to trigger a process that was to change the profile of  
health service distribution in the city of  São Paulo.
The 2004 elections were polarised between Marta Suplicy of  the PT 
and José Serra of  the PSDB, former health minister for Brazilian 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Health was a prominent 
topic in electoral debates, with José Serra winning the elections with 
54.86 per cent of  run-off election votes. 
3.3 Policies pursued, 2005–08
In 2005, José Serra took over as mayor. He held the position from 2005 
to 2006, when he ran for governor, leaving his deputy, Gilberto Kassab 
(from the DEM party – now allied with the PSDB) in his place.
Investment in the FHP continued and an important innovation was 
introduced: outpatient care facilities (assistência médica ambulatorial 
– AMAs). These facilities were intended to meet demand for low-
complexity urgent and emergency care cases, which the public system 
was unable to cope with, and which was acknowledged to be a chronic 
problem that ended up encouraging these types of  patients to turn to 
accident and emergency facilities in the hospital system. 
Starting in 2005, the service agreements with OSSs for staffing the 
FHP indirectly via labour contracting were replaced with management 
contracts; a management tool largely used by the PSDB when it was 
at the helm of  the federal and state governments. In these contracts 
pre-certified OSSs were chosen, based on public call processes, to 
manage public facilities and provide services that were pre-defined by 
health authorities, receiving government funding granted on the basis 
of  results-based oversight. 
This type of  contract established a more demanding process than the 
convênios that had been used up to that point. These stricter demands 
applied to the health authority, which now had to plan what would be 
demanded from units, price the contracted services, and monitor the 
performance of  these services on a quarterly basis; they also applied to 
the provider, who now had to deliver the previously agreed-upon results. 
These contracts also began to be used at AMAs. In 2007, 39 PHCCs 
and four AMAs were being managed under contracts of  this kind.
Januário Montone took over the Municipal Health Secretariat in 
November 2007, and was tasked by Kassab with extending the 
OSS-administered management contract model. That task was to be 
facilitated by new regulations that the government had just managed 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 2 March 2018: ‘Accountability for Health Equity: Galvanising a Movement for Universal Health Coverage’ 109–128 | 117
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
to enact through the Municipal Council, relaxing the OSS selection 
procedures and easing the requirements social health organisations had 
to meet in order to participate in the arrangement. This legislation was 
passed amidst heated debates between groups in favour of  and against 
contracting OSSs. 
These shifts in direction meant that between 2005 and 2008, important 
changes were made to the profile of  the municipal public health system. 
From 2008 onwards, the city saw AMAs proliferate and the numbers of  
urgent and emergency appointments grow in all regions. 
The 2008 elections were competed between the PT, PSDB, and DEM. 
Candidates from these three parties promised to expand the primary 
care network and FHP teams. Marta Suplicy moreover proposed 
strengthening the Municipal Health Council, while Geraldo Alckmin 
and Gilberto Kassab promised to add more OSS contracts. The dispute 
was heated between the three candidates in the first round of  voting, 
with Kassab (DEM) taking 33.6 per cent of  the vote, Suplicy (PT) 
32.7 per cent, and Alckmin (PSDB) 22.48 per cent. Kassab won the 
run-off election with just over 60 per cent of  the vote. 
3.4 Policies pursued, 2009–12
From 2009 to 2012, Kassab and Montone continued as mayor and head 
of  the Municipal Health Secretariat respectively throughout the entire 
administration. During Montone’s mandate, outsourcing processes 
intensified and OSSs started to be engaged under contract to manage 
both health facilities and micro-regions. In his own words,
I know of  no other municipality in Brazil that has invested as much in partnering 
with non-profit enterprise as São Paulo. This was due not only to the city’s 
enormous size, but also to the ongoing endeavour to develop this model, which had 
been started at the state level in 2001 and adopted by the capital in 2005.12
Disputing the 2012 election were Fernando Haddad of  the PT, 
ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s former Minister of  Education; 
José Serra (PSDB), once again running in the municipal election; and 
Celso Russomanno (Brazilian Republican Party), a reporter and host of  
popular TV programmes. While Serra was the ruling-party candidate, 
forced to defend and propose continuing Kassab’s legacy, Haddad 
used party propaganda to criticise the PSDB candidate’s health policy 
and OSS contracts, proposing that rounds of  civil service exams be 
held to reinforce health civil servant staff, in addition to effectively 
decentralising management of  the health system and strengthening 
mechanisms of  control and social participation. Celso Russomanno 
did not present any health proposals. Haddad defeated Serra in run-off 
voting with 55.6 per cent of  the vote. 
3.5 Policies pursued, 2013–16
In 2013, Fernando Haddad (PT) took over as mayor and in 2015, 
Alexandre Padilha, the Health Secretary and a former Minister 
of  Health in the national PT-led government of  Dilma Rousseff, 
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expedited migration of  OSS contracts to a new management model 
aimed at promoting quality and guaranteeing better management 
accountability. With this, the four types of  OSS contracts used up to 
that point – micro-region, municipal hospital management, boroughs, 
and emergency care contracts – began to be replaced with integrated 
health-care system contracts. At the time, a public call for bids was 
held for OSSs to apply to manage the 22 territorial systems that were 
then instituted. These contracts had a five-year term, with the work 
plan renewed every 12 months. At the same time, this innovation 
contradicted one of  Haddad’s campaign promises to reduce the 
presence of  OSSs in the city, and recovered the PT’s traditional stance 
on territorialisation, aimed at promoting intersectorality13 based on 
a territorial focus. Figure 2 shows the OSSs responsible for these 
22 territorial systems. 
An expansion of  the supply of  emergency care units (unidades de pronto 
atendimento – UPAs) was also planned. The UPAs are somewhat more 
complex units than the AMAs and were launched in 2003, under a PT 
administration, as part of  the National Urgent and Emergency Policy. 
Figure 2 OSSs responsible for territorial health-care system management in the 
municipality of São Paulo, 2017
Source Adapted from Municipal Health Secretariat/CEInfo, www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/
cidade/secretarias/saude/acesso_a_informacao/index.php?p=178347.
SPDM: Associação Paulista para o 
Desenvolvimento da Medicina
IABAS: Instituto de Atenção Básica e 
Avançada à Saúde
ASF: Associação Saúde da Família
CEJAM: Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas 
‘Dr. João Amorim’
SECONCI: Serviço Social da Construção 
Civil do Estado de São Paulo
Santa Marcelina
Santa Catarina
Fundação ABC
Monte Azul: Associação Comunitária 
Monte Azul
In process of contracting
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The election of  2016 was once again polarised between the PT and 
PSDB, with João Doria (PSDB) promising to increase basic health 
coverage in the city from 61 per cent to 70 per cent and to reduce waiting 
times for examinations and other more complex procedures. Doria was 
elected in the first round of  voting with 53.29 per cent of  the vote.
The distributive impacts of  the policies described above are explored in 
Section 4. 
4 Changes in distribution of facilities and services 
As mentioned in Sections 1 and 3, in 2001 there was a strong 
distributive bias in favour of  central areas of  the city, which also 
enjoyed the best socioeconomic and epidemiological indicators. In this 
section, evidence is sought on what impact the policies applied by the 
municipality between 2001 and 2016 had on that profile. To do this, 
we chose indicators that describe the distribution of  health facilities 
and primary care services over the period: (1) provision of  primary care 
appointments per year, and (2) percentage of  live births with provision 
of  seven or more antenatal appointments. 
4.1 Facilities
Table 1 shows that health facilities, particularly the number of  primary 
health care centres (PHCCs), expanded significantly during the period. 
The Marta Suplicy administration saw substantial growth in PHCCs. 
These were FHP centres offering primary care through priority 
programmes and scheduled appointments. Under Serra and Kassab, 
growth was in the number of  AMAs, which offered urgent and 
emergency care and low-complexity tests and treatment. Haddad 
introduced the UPAs. Expansion of  the PHCCs was initially made 
feasible through service agreements, and later, starting in 2008, through 
management contracts with OSSs. 
Table 1 Number of public health facilities, municipality of São Paulo, 2000–16
Public 
health 
facilities
Mayor
Suplicy Serra/Kassab Kassab Haddad
2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Hospitals 51 50 53 51 51 52 53 53 55 53 55 55 54 54 49 54 54
PHCCs 135 225 237 236 382 392 407 407 416 434 438 439 442 443 454 449 451
AMAs14 0 0 0 0 0 10 33 55 116 130 131 133 139 134 133 53 42
UPAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Note * Entries start in 2000 to show the pre-existing figures.  
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Municipal Health Secretariat.
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4.2 Service supply 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of  primary care appointments offered 
to the population who exclusively used the SUS, grouped by the HDI 
of  the borough they lived in. It can be seen that the percentage of  SUS 
users living in boroughs with the worst indicators remained constant 
during the period, while the percentage of  primary care offered to the 
SUS users in these low-HDI boroughs grew significantly. 
The average number of  primary care appointments per SUS user per 
year grew significantly in the 31 boroughs during the period, increasing 
from 1.8 in 2002 to 2.6 in 2016. Figure 4 visualises the distribution 
of  primary care appointments during the period based on boxplot. It 
shows the 31 boroughs ordered by number of  appointments per SUS 
user per year, from lowest to highest, and split into four equal groups 
– Group 1 includes the boroughs offering the lowest 25 per cent of  
appointments, Groups 2 and 3 the middle 50 per cent, and Group 4 
the highest 25 per cent. These groups are represented along the range 
of  distribution for each year in the period, with the median number 
of  appointments shown by the black line in the grey box. It shows 
that in 2002, the median was below two primary care appointments, 
an amount corresponding to the parameter recommended by the 
Ministry of  Health; while in 2016, over 50 per cent of  boroughs offered 
appointments in excess of  this parameter.15
Figure 3 Percentage of primary care appointments offered to SUS population, grouped by borough HDI, municipality 
of São Paulo, 2002–16 
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Municipal Health Secretariat. 
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Table 2 shows that, for the population of  the municipality as a whole, 
the percentage of  live births with provision of  seven or more antenatal 
appointments increased by 24.1 per cent between 2001 and 2012. 
In this period, the boroughs in the first and second quartiles posted 
increases greater than the municipal mean. These increases in excess of  
the mean occurred during Marta Suplicy’s administration and also, to 
a lesser degree, during the Serra/Kassab administration. As a result of  
that trend, by 2016, the situation had changed, with the values of  the 
three lower quartiles converging strongly.
Overall, considering the profile of  service distribution in 2001 among 
the boroughs ordered in quartiles by HDI, the fourth quartile can 
always be seen as better placed, followed by the third, second, and 
first quartiles. By 2016, the situation had changed, with the values of  
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the three lower quartiles converging. These results show that public 
health services expanded considerably during the period to areas of  the 
municipality where socioeconomic conditions were worse. 
5 Discussion and final remarks
This article contains an analysis of  the primary care policies implemented 
in the municipality of  São Paulo from 2001 to 2016. As can be seen 
above, the physical infrastructure of  the SUS, particularly PHCCs and 
AMAs, expanded considerably over the period, as did the volume of  
primary care provided to the city’s residents. The inequalities in access to 
those services were also found to have diminished, with rates of  service 
delivery converging among the three quartiles of  boroughs grouped by 
lower municipal HDIs. These results, as pointed out earlier, are not trivial 
and deserve attention as they represent a rather unusual pattern.
The supposition explored in this study is that these results were made 
possible by strong electoral competition and modest access to public health 
services in poor and densely populated areas. In this context, the promise 
of  improving services for the poor represents an attractive programme 
that could garner votes for parties with different ideological orientations. 
The institutional conditions found in the city – financial and managerial 
capacity located inside the Municipal Health Secretariat, and the 
presence of  OSSs already delivering primary care – explain ‘how’ this 
programme could be achieved. In short, the presence of  claims for 
answerability (from the poor to politicians and from public officials to 
OSSs) and the possibility of  sanctions (losing elections and contracts) 
at both the political and managerial levels played a crucial role in 
facilitating the expansion of  public primary health services in the poor 
Table 2 Percentage of live births with provision of seven or more antenatal appointments, by quartile,* municipality of 
São Paulo, 2001–16
Municipality/
Quartile
Mayor
Variation 
(%)
Suplicy Serra/Kassab Kassab Haddad
2001 
(%)
2004 
(%)
2005 
(%)
2008 
(%)
2009 
(%)
2012 
(%)
2013 
(%)
2016 
(%)
2001–2016
Municipality 60.0 65.4 69.8 73.3 74.0 74.5 75.8 77.9 29.8
1st Quartile 51.5 58.7 65.5 69.9 71.5 71.0 72.2 75.3 46.3
2nd Quartile 58.0 63.7 67.0 70.5 71.3 74.0 75.2 77.6 33.7
3rd Quartile 61.9 67.5 72.0 74.3 73.7 73.6 75.1 77.0 24.3
4th Quartile 73.8 77.9 80.0 81.8 82.4 81.8 83.8 84.8 14.9
Notes Dates refer to the beginning and end of each mandate. 
* Quartiles represent boroughs grouped by HDI, as described in Section 2; lower quartiles include boroughs with low HDIs. 
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Municipal Health Secretariat.
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peripheries of  São Paulo. The closeness of  the contest waged between 
the PT and the PSDB/DEM alliance for the municipal government is 
clear from the electoral results: none of  the successful candidates took 
more than 61 per cent of  votes in the four run-off ballots. Added to this 
is São Paulo’s importance in Brazilian national politics and the value the 
parties ascribe to their electoral performance in the city. There is also 
the politicians’ aspiration to leave their mark on the history of  public 
health in the country’s leading economic and cultural hub. 
Eduardo Jorge, Marta Suplicy’s Health Secretary, strongly supported 
the FHP, investing in primary health care and betting on the possible 
electoral returns that might accrue from a programme implemented 
quickly and that would reach a considerable portion of  the population, 
particularly in the city’s underserved areas. In order to carry that plan 
forward and in the face of  the limits on direct hiring imposed by the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act, he invested in expanding installed capacity 
and signing agreements with 12 OSSs, several of  which had already 
operated in the city’s primary care programmes. 
The Serra and Kassab administrations continued to invest in the FHP, 
but the Serra/Kassab flagship was the AMAs, which concentrated on 
urgent and emergency care, with a view to both electoral gains from 
decongesting and rationalising the service network and an SUS that 
was more closely aligned with the model of  care applied by the private 
sector. The underlying alignment of  interests supporting this project 
rested on strengthening service supply via OSSs. 
The Haddad administration maintained investment in the FHP and 
also, contrary to electoral campaign promises, the alliance with OSSs. 
However, it sought to redefine the management model, focusing it 
more on the concept of  integrated management of  the territory, which 
sounded more like a PT-type platform. 
To better understand how managerial accountability worked, it should 
be considered that outsourcing made it easier to both hire new staff 
when health units were opened or expanded and to lay off staff when 
performance was not satisfactory, or even to hire staff in the case of  
high turnover. This mechanism made an important contribution 
to guaranteeing that there were health professionals, and especially 
physicians, in the periphery and hard-to-access areas of  the city. The 
fact that health-care providers linked to these partnerships had more 
incentive to accurately deliver, as their contracts were dependent on 
achieving pre-defined goals, was also a significant factor. Finally, the 
Municipal Health Secretariat invested in establishing management 
capacity in relation to contracts. 
In 2001, the Municipal Health Secretariat expanded the FHP, initially 
using service agreements (convênios), a looser form of  contract and a type 
of  accountability mechanism focused on accountability for money. In 
2005, at the start of  the Serra administration, these agreements began 
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to be replaced by performance contracts with OSSs, which introduced a 
new logic into the relationship between public managers and providers, 
based on the possibility of  these organisations managing equipment 
and providing public services. At that point, contracts focused on 
service outputs and indicators. Finally, in 2015, the various types of  
management contracts in effect were replaced by those where a single 
OSS would manage the contracts for a health region. The rationale was 
to shift from a service-centred evaluation to accountability for health 
outcomes in a given territory. In parallel, investments were made in 
establishing management capacity in relation to these contracts, with 
the creation of  a Technical Center for Contracting Health Services to 
plan, define, and assess OSS contracts and performance in the regions. 
These movements to expand service supply by offering continuing care, 
urgent care, and emergency care to poor peripheral areas of  the city 
were aligned with the programmes of  left-wing and centrist parties, 
which since the 1980s had called attention to the need to expand the 
offer of  public health-care services to those areas. In the 2000s, at a 
moment where it was important for the PT, PSDB, and DEM to ensure 
the votes of  the poor, this flagship appeared as a political priority. 
Nevertheless, political priority alone does not explain the distributive 
changes described in this article. It was the combination of  the political 
environment with the existence of  experienced OSSs in the city, as 
well as financial and managerial capacity in the Municipal Health 
Secretariat that worked together to promote the changes described. 
Demands for answerability – from the poor to politicians and from 
public officials to OSSs – and the existence of  sanctions – the possibility 
of  losing elections and contracts – were core to explaining how the 
changes described in the distributive profile were made possible.
In short, if  the presence of  political accountability mechanisms 
contributed to making the health equity agenda attractive to municipal 
politicians, it was the ability of  these same politicians along with the 
Municipal Health Secretariat to mobilise OSSs – several of  which 
were already present in the city and had know-how in relation to 
implementing primary care programmes – and hold them accountable 
under service delivery contracts that made it feasible to expand the 
supply of  services to areas on the periphery of  the city. Ultimately, these 
accountability mechanisms make it possible to understand why and 
how the new policies were adopted and were able to contribute to the 
distributive changes examined in this article.
Notes
* This article presents the results of  the Equity and Contracting 
of  Services in the SUS project, supported by the São Paulo 
Research Foundation (FAPESP) – FAPESP 2013/07616-7, and the 
Accountability Politics of  Reducing Health Inequities: Learning from 
Brazil and Mozambique project, supported by the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC). The projects are coordinated by the 
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Citizenship, Health and Development team at the Brazilian Center 
for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), the Center for Metropolitan 
Studies (CEM), Brazil and the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS), 
UK. The opinions, hypotheses and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed herein are the responsibility of  the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the visions of  FAPESP, DFID, or ESRC.
✝ This article was presented at the Unpicking Power and Politics 
for Transformative Change: Towards Accountability for Health 
Equity workshop at IDS in July 2017. I am thankful for the valuable 
comments I received at that workshop from the participants in the 
Accountability Responses to the Spread of  Health Markets panel, 
and to the external and internal reviewers of  this IDS Bulletin. 
1 In 2010, CEBRAP’s Citizenship, Health and Development team 
joined CEM’s project Inequality Trajectories in Brazil, which revisited 
50 years of  official data produced by the national census. The project 
team agreed to use the notion of  inequalities instead of  inequities, 
as it avoids the normative content of  the concept of  equity, which is 
highly disputed in political debates in Brazil. The team use the term 
‘health inequalities’ to refer to the differences, in descriptive terms, in 
levels of  health among population groups identified on the basis of  
socioeconomic, gender, race, colour, and ethnic characteristics.
2 By law the federal government and the municipalities are obliged to 
spend 15 per cent of  their revenues on health promotion and service 
delivery, while states are obliged to spend 12 per cent of  their revenue. 
3 Information on the number of  SUS users is estimated using data on 
the number of  people with private health insurance. An SUS user 
does not have access to private health insurance. Information on 
private health insurance is available from the Agência Nacional de 
Saúde Suplementar (National Agency of  Supplementary Health).
4 For the period 2001–16, changes to how official expenditure was 
registered hindered construction of  historical series showing total 
amounts spent by the three spheres of  government on health in the 
municipality of  São Paulo. Nevertheless, we know that between 
1995 and 2010, health-care spending in Brazil rose from 6.7 per cent 
to 8.9 per cent of  gross domestic product (GDP), with the public 
sector portion of  that total rising from 43 per cent to 47 per cent. In 
addition, the amount spent on primary care grew from 10 per cent 
of  total public sector spending in 1995, to around 18 per cent in 
2011 (Mendes and Marques 2014). Consolidated data on São Paulo 
for the period 2013–15 show stability in expenditure, even with a 
fiscal crisis occurring, and primary care received 13 per cent of  total 
expenditure, which is a significant amount when it is noted that São 
Paulo holds the highest concentration of  services for high-complexity 
care in Brazil (Xavier 2017). 
5 In informal conversations, it is usual to hear that the services provided 
by private not-for-profit social health organisations (organizações 
sociais de saúde – OSSs) in São Paulo are more expensive than direct 
administration services. The little work that has tested this relationship 
suggests that greater expenditure is accompanied by gains in 
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efficiency, which would be reflected in lower costs per unit offered 
(Barradas and Mendes 2007; Medici 2011). These observations are 
interesting since they are in opposition to the international debate, 
which associates the use of  outsourcing with constraining costs. 
6 The SUS population is calculated from the population who 
exclusively use the SUS, which means those without private health 
insurance. For the Municipality of  São Paulo, see:  
www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/upload/saude/
arquivos/boletimeletronico/n01popsus.pdf. 
7 The information is provided by the Ministry of  Health and the São 
Paulo Municipal Health Secretariat.
8 Qualis was implemented in the East Zone by Casa de Saúde 
Santa Marcelina, in the North and Southeast Zones by Fundação 
Zerbini, and in the South Zone by Universidade Santo Amaro and 
Congregação Santa Catarina (Coelho et al. 2014).
9 According to the 2010 census, these boroughs had populations 
ranging from 139,441 to 594,930. 
10 Gonzalo Vecina took over as Health Secretary when Jorge left.
11 Interview with Gonzalo Vecina, 16 November 2011.
12 http://saudeweb.com.br/22516/gestao-com-oss-e-ppp-e-modelo-de-
sucesso-diz-januario-montone/.
13 Intersectorality is an approach that is meant to bring together 
different policy areas such as health, sanitation, education, urban 
policies, environment and so forth. The idea is to break the strong 
vertical hierarchy present in these policies (where decisions in each 
policy area are made independently) and promote more horizontal 
connections between them. 
14 AMAs here include Ambulatório Médico de Especialidades (AMEs – 
outpatient facilities designed to handle medium-complexity cases in 
various specialities). In 2012, there were 16 AMEs in the city.
15 The Friedman Test shows that the distribution of  primary care 
appointments per SUS user in the boroughs in 2002 was different to 
the distribution in 2012.
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